The Structural causes and effects of Darfur Crisis: A critical analysis

Abstract: The situation in the western Darfur region of Sudan has been labelled the worst humanitarian crisis in the world today. A conflict between rebel forces on the one side, and the Sudanese Government and the government backed Janjaweed militia on the other, has left between 10,000 and 30,000 people dead. An estimated 1.3 million civilians have been displaced from their homes. Aid agencies and governments warn of the potential for a humanitarian catastrophe brought on by famine and disease, unless urgent action is taken to improve the security of the civilian population and to provide food and shelter. This paper argues that the Darfur crisis is an outcome of Khartoum elites’ attempt to obtain absolute control of national wealth and power over the entire Sudan. In this paper, we also try to discuss theoretical explanation of Darfur crises. Here, we also discuss Structural violence, in the form of pervasive discrimination, marginalization and inequality, created resentment and resistance that triggered overt violence. Secondly, it argues that the situation is described differently, therefore, is subscripted to different storylines which are open to the manipulation of practical geopolitics. There is a gap between naming and acting toward the situation. As the result, the strategic significance in resolving the crisis is undermined, and human security in Darfur remains dire. This papers also discusses how international community responses this crises.

Introduction:

The Republic of Sudan, the largest country in Africa, lies on the western shore of the Red Sea. It is bordered by Eritrea and Ethiopia to the east, Kenya, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo to the south, the Central African Republic, Chad and Libya to the west, and Egypt to the north.. The population of around 28 million comprises a diverse range of ethnic groupings which speak over 400 languages. On one level, the civil war that has afflicted the country almost continuously since independence in 1956 can be seen as a conflict between the Arab Muslim north and the black African, and predominantly Christian or animist, south. At a more detailed level, other features of the conflict emerge. Alan Phillips, the Director of Minority Rights Group International, wrote in 1995 that attempts to portray the conflict in North-South or Arab-African terms disguise “the complexities of a war fought by multi-ethnic groups where religious differences colour struggles over access to land or political power.”[1] Sudan is ruled by the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Islamist regime under General Omar Al-Bashir, which has its powerbase in the mainly Arab and Muslim north of the country. The centre and south is inhabited by a mixture of different African linguistic groups, which are mainly Christian or animist. Southern groups, most notably the Dink dominated Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), have repeatedly sought to gain significant autonomy or independence from Khartoum, and some have resorted to armed struggle to achieve this.

Outbreak of conflict:

Open conflict erupted in Darfur in February 2003 when the well-armed SLM/A and the JEM took advantage of turmoil within the al-Bashir regime and launched attacks on government military bases. A series of rebel successes ensued during the first half of 2003, before government forces regrouped and responded with a counter-insurgency campaign. Government-backed Janjaweed militia fighters carried out raids on communities suspected of aiding or sympathising with the rebels, and it is the humanitarian impact of these attacks which forms the core of the present crisis. Observers have reported evidence of close coordination between the Government and the Janjaweed, with the latter receiving not only money and guns, but also close air support from Sudanese fighter jets, which have bombed villages in preparation for militia raids. Claims have also been made of rape and killings of civilians by the militias, and humanitarian organisations have accused the Government and the Janjaweed of conducting a “scorched earth” campaign in the region. The Government has officially denied assisting the Janjaweed, although the national humanitarian aid commissioner, Dr Sulaf al-Din, acknowledged in March 2004 that:

We asked all the people of Darfur that they should help in protecting themselves against the rebellion. This standard practice which we do in this country. Whenever there is an attack on a community we ask the local community to also support, to help

Here is the map where  we see the conflict prone area of Darfur:

It has strenuously denied responsibility for the Janjaweed attacks on non-Arab civilians and for any violations of international humanitarian law, saying that such violations are the work of individuals outside its control.[2]

Theoretical explanation of Darfur crisis:

There are different types of approach of ethnic conflict. Two of those are prominent. Primordialist approach: and Instrumentalist approach. In the Darfur  case, according to our study both approach are applicable. Historical diversity was reality and political leaders used people in their own interest.

Primordial’s approach:

Proponents of primordial’s accounts of ethnic conflict argue that “ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location”. The primordial’s account relies on a concept of kinship between members of an ethnic group. According to primordial’s approach, they think themselves different from the others.  Since the beginning of the dependence in 1956, conflict between Arab Muslims in the north and the Black African in the South part who are basically Christian or animist, is available. The South ethnic groups think they are being deprived and exploited. So they started the revolt against the central government.  

Instrumentalist approach:

That the instrumentalist account “came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, in the debate about (white) ethnic persistence in what was supposed to have been an effective melting pot”. This new theory sought to explain such persistence as the result of the actions of community leaders, “who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes”. In this account of ethnic identification, “ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as means to particular ends”. In Darfur case, community leaders mobilized their ethnic people against the government. In Darfur case in February 2003, well armed SLMA and JEM leaders mobilized and launch attacked against the government and they had been successful in their mobilization. After long war against the central government in 2011 they came in success and established South Sudan. On the other hand, when conflict was started government also mobilized the ethnic groups for their political interest. Government-backed Janjaweed ethnic group against the  SLMA and JEM. Janjaweed was Muslim and in favor of the government.

Origins of the conflict:

The origins of the conflict in Darfur are accounted for by numerous factors that include historical

violence in the region, ethnic divisions, social, political and economic marginalization. They are similar to those of conflicts in southern and eastern Sudan which are rooted in the constant struggle over power-sharing that weak central governance, under-development and the lack of diverse political involvement structure produced. The Darfur crisis is an outcome of the struggle

for power between Sudan’s central government and peripherals. Simmering structural violence finally exploded into physical conflicts and genocidal campaigns when Khartoum imperialists ‘goal was threatened.

Structural Causes:

The structural causes the Darfur conflict are rooted in two major elements: the legacy of colonialism in the Sudan and the formation of a post-colonial ‘predatory’ state.

The Legacy of Colonialism in the Sudan:

The Sudan or ‘Bilad al Sudan’ (the land of the blacks) is the largest country in the African continent. Sudan’s vast territory is rich in natural resources including oil, gold, and various minerals. Its territory is also dominated by the Nile and its tributaries; therefore, Sudan enjoys major resources for hydropower. In addition, the fertile soil along the Nile is the key hub for agricultural development that has made Sudan the ‘bread basket’ of the continent. Sudan’s administrative central government was established and located in the northern region of Khartoum; but recruited labor (slaves) and exploited resources (mostly agricultural products such

as cotton, grains, spices, and later oil revenues) hail from the southern and western regions.[3]

The‘metro pole’ economy created by the colonial structure left a heavy imprint on the modern Sudan state which inevitably became dependent on the exploitation of its regional resources - in both natural and human (labor) matters Central government relies on regional economic resources to maintain its political and military power. The government in Khartoum had never been freed from the impact of colonialist policy. Khartoum, the administrative and political capital, was built on exploitive and divisive culture dating back to the Turco-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian colonial periods in the 18th century. The ‘divide and rule’ strategies that the rulers have applied since then have brought about “the problems of the unequal distribution of wealth present in the modern Sudan [and] the irregular modern development throughout the country”.

The Post-Colonial ‘Predatory’ State

The formation of the current authoritarian government is a critical landmark of the struggle for power inside the Sudan. This government is ruled by an Arab-led party that has the characteristics of a ‘predatory’ state. Like other African ‘predatory’ states that Castells (1998:96-105) described, the Sudanese state operates under “the politics of the belly” and “a process of individualization of ruling classes” that make the state “entirely patrimonial zed by political elites for their own personal profits”[4]

 The members of state “tend to be mercenaries, as their hold on positions of privilege and power is at the mercy of the capricious decisions of an ultimate leader”[5] with bloody dictatorial rules, ideological stripes to be corrupt, rapacious, insufficient, and unstable. As a result, it produces exploitive and discriminatory practices for personalized accumulation of wealth and power, as well as political factions, clientelistic networks and alliances to exercise pillage and violent confrontation to attain power which often create overt clashes and instability. The Khartoum government is politically dominated by Arab elites. The state is headed by President - Lt. Gen. Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, who created the ruling machine, known as the Ingaz (Salvation) regime. The regime includes an alliance of the military junta and the National Congress Party (NPC) - formerly known as the National Islamic Front (NIF) or the Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood (SMB). The NCP's "Group of Ten", including General Bashir and nine Muslim leaders 'reincarnated' from the NIF, is the ‘patronage’ of the state of Sudan who try to attain the absolute ‘personal appropriation of state’ by establishing an Arab ‘clientelistic network’. Arab sheiks are placed at local government offices in charge of taxation and the ‘recruitment’ of local manpower and resources. Despite the large agricultural production and huge oil revenues, peripheral Sudan suffers abject poverty as a ‘substantial discount’ is claimed by the government, at all levels, when these revenues are processed.[6]

Proximate Causes

Discrimination along ethnic lines, marginalization of the African tribes from the central government power, and uneven distribution of national wealth has a long history and has produced overt violence in the Sudan – the protracted north-south civil war is an example. Pervasive resistance has been a constant threat to Khartoum authority over the country. Therefore, “whether in the interest of security, access to resources, ideology, race or religion and

sometimes all of the above - Sudan's government is willing to destroy the lives and livelihoods of

millions of its own citizens to maintain its grip on power” (Lefkow, 2004). The failure of the Sudan government to synchronize their exertion of power over Darfur resulted in a bloody

conflict.[7]

Darfur’s Power-Relationship with Khartoum

About the size of France or Texas, Darfur is ‘a place of superlatives’. More than a desert area, in

fact, Darfur is astride one of Africa’s great migration and camel caravan routes, and has always

been one of the continent’s richest melting pots. It is not a remote arid area of western Sudan but

is the heartland of North Africa that is geopolitically and economically important to Khartoum.

First, Darfur’s agricultural products and considerable oil revenues account for a large amount of

Sudan's domestic income. Its manpower contributes a large proportion of both Sudan’s labor

and 40 percent of Sudanese military forces. Owning hundred miles of western Sudan borderline, Darfur occupies major regional trade-routes including a regional path for arms-trade that keeps arms-flows running smoothly within the tumultuous western Africa region. Although there are no publicized statistics, the Sudanese government has benefited largely from arms trade with Chadian factions during the internationalized Chadian civil war in the 1980s.[8]

The perceived threat from Darfur

Darfur’s strategic position to Khartoum turned into a deadly factor when Khartoum feared that

they would lose their power over the region to Darfurian rebels. Khartoum’s exploitation and discrimination created resistance. Violence in Darfur erupted as the disenfranchised population rose up. African rebels justify their action as a counter-marginalization movement; “they claim to take up arms to fight against the legacy of decades of discrimination for more political power and a share of Sudan’s $1 million-per-day oil revenue” Darfur rebels’ attack on government military installation was an attack on Arab leadership.[9]

 The revolt is a threat to Khartoum’s authority. Having already been challenged and threatened by the uprising populations throughout the country, Khartoum used proxy Arab militias not only to retaliate but to eliminate an increasing threat it perceived from Darfur. The government backed-militia is reportedly carrying out deliberate attacks on Darfur civilians, with the order not only to put down a rebellion but also to “kill all the slaves”. Decades of government structural violence reached the tipping point when Darfurian rebels – fighting in the name of the people of Darfur – fearedtheir people were excluded in the national power-sharing agreement signed only betweenKhartoum and the SPLA. For fear of complete disenfranchisement, the rebels began their ownrevolution. In retaliation, with its weak military power and poor diplomatic capacity, thegovernment sponsored and equipped militia genocidal campaigns to secure its authority over

Darfur.

International Response

The UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement on 25 May in 2005:

The Council expresses its grave concern over the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights situation in the Darfur region of Sudan. Noting that thousands have been killed and that hundreds of thousands of people are at risk of dying in the coming months, the Council emphasizes the need for immediate humanitarian access to the vulnerable population[10]

Deployment of Ceasefire Commission Observers

Under the N’djamena agreement, the parties to the conflict agreed to allow the deployment of observers to monitor the ceasefire. A team of 120 observers, led by the African Union, has been dispatched to Darfur. The European Union has allocated €12 million ($14.5 million) to help fund the mission.

A mission headquarters has been established in al-Fashir in northern Darfur, although as of 18 June the actual monitoring of the ceasefire had yet to begin. Mr Benn reported on June that the mission would be fully operational within four to six weeks. The Chairman of the African Union and former president of Mali, Alpha Omar Konare, arrived in Sudan on 20 June on a two day visit to push for progress on enforcing the ceasefire.

Implications for Chad

During April and May 2004 there were signs that the conflict was spilling over into the neighbouring state of Chad. Camps in the east of the country host as many as 150,000 refugees from Darfur.President Idriss Deby, who came to power in a coup in 1990, enjoys good relations withthe Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, and observers believe he has tacitly backed theSudanese campaign in Darfur. However, there are signs of dissent within Mr Deby’s Government and among army officers, some of whom have ethnic ties with the Darfur rebels across the border. It is believed that elements within the Chadian military have supplied arms and materiel to the rebel groups. Reports suggest that Janjaweed militias have responded by mounting cross-border raids aimed at fomenting ethnic unrest in eastern Chad and disrupting the flow of weapons. Allami Ahmat, a diplomatic adviser to the Chadian president and spokesman for Chad’s mediation effort, claimed in mid-June that: “There is a covert force seeking to transport the inter-Sudanese conflict inside Chad.”[11]

Position of the British Governmen

The Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Benn, made a Statement to the House on 9 June following a visit to Sudan and the Darfur region. He said the crisis in Darfur was “the most serious humanitarian emergency in the world today.The British Government believes the deployment of ceasefire monitors will help createsuch an atmosphere. The Prime Minister’s special envoy to Sudan, Alan Goulty, said inlate May that he did not support calls for military intervention in Darfur or for theimposition of sanctions on the Sudanese Government:

In the long term, threats of sanctions don't seem likely to produce immediate action and immediate action is what we need. The more time we spend dithering, the more people will die.

Debate on the International Response

The vacillation of the international community during the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the tenth anniversary of which was observed in April 2004, has been cited by some observers as a warning of what might come to pass in Sudan if prompt and robust action is not taken.A debate has developed over terminology and whether the events in Darfur can be described as “ethnic cleansing” and/or “genocide”. “Ethnic cleansing” is a colloquial term used by the media and other observers, and has no legal meaning, although it refers to acts that may constitute crimes in themselves, such as the deportation or forcible transfer of population.45 Furthermore, the term “genocide” has a distinct legal definition under the 1948 Genocide Convention,46 and examples of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans have now been recognised as genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).[12]

CONCLUSION

The Darfur crisis originates in the failure of state elites in balancing their power struggle. They used sovereign impunity to justify genocidal campaigns against citizens that challenged their power. Economic disparity, discriminatory environment, marginalization and inequality have always been the cause of disputes between the ‘elitist’ power structure and those groups wanting equality in Sudan. The exploitation of Sudan’s peripheral regions has impoverished the population while wealth and power accumulated in the hands of a selected few in Khartoum. The religious-fundamentalist regime also links the State to religion to deliberately practice discrimination and favoritism to separate African groups from national power and wealth sharing. Its structural violence, in the form of discrimination and marginalization, reached the ‘tipping point’ and produced physical conflict with the disenfranchised population. Khartoum’s

failure to balance its power struggle resulted in a bloody crisis.

References:

                                                 I.            Stein, Howard, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, ICG Africa Report No.76, 25 March 2004; Available at, http://194.203.40.90/default.asp?PageId=88,accessed on July 5, 2012.

2.      King, Kenneth,Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, ICG Africa Report No.80, 23 May 2004;available at, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/21/sudan8882.htm,accessed on July 5, 2012.

3.      Ylonen, Aleksi, “Greivances and the Roots of Insurgencies: Southern Sudan and Darfur”, Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 7, July 2005, available at http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk.accessed on July 5, 2012

4.      Johnson, “Food Aid, Land Tenure & the Survival of the Subsistence Economy”, available at http://www.bicc.de/events/sudanws/10johnson17june02.pdf, accessed on July 5, 2012.

5.      Douglas H. Johnson, “Food Aid, Land Tenure & The Survival of the Subsistence Economy”, conference paper presented at “Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan”, Brussels, June 12-13, p. 2, available  at http://www.bicc.de/events/sudanws/10johnson17june02.pdf, accessed on July 5, 2012 .

6.      Ann Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998),

7.      Edgar O’Ballance, The Secret War in Sudan: 1955-1972 (London: Faber and Faber, 1977

THE END

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[1] Stein, Howard, Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, ICG Africa Report No.76, 25 March 2004; Available at,http://194.203.40.90/default.asp?PageId=88,accessed on July 5, 2012.page,11

[2] King, Kenneth,Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, ICG Africa Report No.80, 23 May 2004;available at, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/21/sudan8882.htm,accessed on July 5, 2012.

Page no,7-8

[3] Ibid,page No.12

[4] Ylonen, Aleksi, “Greivances and the Roots of Insurgencies: Southern Sudan and Darfur”, Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 7, July 2005, available at http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk.accessed on July 5, 2012,page, 34

[5] johnson, “Food Aid, Land Tenure & the Survival of the Subsistence Economy”, available at http://www.bicc.de/events/sudanws/10johnson17june02.pdf, accessed on July 5, 2012.page No 8

[6] Ibid,Page No,9

[7] Douglas H. Johnson, “Food Aid, Land Tenure & The Survival of the Subsistence Economy”, conference paper presented at “Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan”, Brussels, June 12-13, p. 2, available  at http://www.bicc.de/events/sudanws/10johnson17june02.pdf, accessed on July 5, 2012 .Page No 22-23

[8] Ibid,page no,24

[9] Ylonen, Aleksi, “Greivances and the Roots of Insurgencies: Southern Sudan and Darfur”, Peace, Conflict and Development: An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 7, July 2005, available at http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk.accessed on July 5, 2012,Page no,34

[10] Johnson, “Food Aid, Land Tenure & the Survival of the Subsistence Economy”, available at http://www.bicc.de/events/sudanws/10johnson17june02.pdf, accessed on July 5, 2012.Page no 55

[11] Ibid,PageNo 56

12.King, Kenneth,Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, ICG Africa Report No.80, 23 May 2004;available at, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/06/21/sudan8882.htm,accessed on July 5, 2012.page No,56